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I. INTRODUcTION AND OVERVIEW
The safeguard measure, or the escape clause mechanism provided
in Article XIX of GAIT 1947 has always been the "ugly duckling" in
the palette of attractive defensive trade options available to states
who wish to withdraw from the Article XI obligation of the 1947
Agreement prohibiting quantitative restrictions on imports. But un-
like the antidumping and countervailing duty option which targets
"unfair trade," Article XIX deals not with the inherent "fairness" of
the onslaught of imports, but merely furnishes a temporary escape
hatch for domestic producers to adapt to serious competition from
foreign manufacturers.
Safeguard measures are thus viewed as "emergency" procedures,
allowing a party to deal with an exceptional situation (arising from
"unforeseen developments") which causes or threatens "serious in-
jury" to domestic producers of like or competing products. Under Ar-
ticle XIX(1) of GATT 1947, the party may take protective action in
the form of, among others, quantitative restrictions or tariff increases
with respect to the product causing the injury, but only "to the extent
and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such in-
* Dr. Jur. Cand., Johann Wolfgang von Goethe Universittit, Frankfurt, Germany; Wissen-
schaftlicher Mitarbeiter, 1993-94, Chair for International Law, European Law & International
Economic Law, Augsburg University; LL.M, magna cum laude, Johann von Goethe Universit~it,
Frankfurt, Germany; M.A. (Bus.Eco.); LL.B & A.B. (Econ.), Ateneo University, Manila; Hans
Seidel Foundation Scholar 1991-94. Many thanks to my colleague and friend, Richard L.
Walker, who read through the manuscript and offered valuable criticism and suggestions. All
errors that remain in the text, however, are mine.
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jury."' The escape clause provision is considered an important aspect
in the implementation of the General Agreement because it allows
affected local producers a "margin of manoeuvre" to respond to a
changing economic situation, when necessary.2
The continuing decline in the relatively small number of safe-
guard measures is inversely proportional to the almost established use
of the Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), either unilaterally admin-
istered by the thriving exporter, or through inter-state bilateral Volun-
tary Restraint Agreements (VRAs) or Voluntary Import Expansion
agreements (VIEs) and Orderly Marketing Arrangements (OMAs), 3
or voluntary undertakings arising from antidumping proceedings-all
of which do not ostensibly conform to the basic GAT- principles of
multilateralism, nondiscrimination, undistorted competition and trans-
parency.' These "gray area" trade measures, although blatantly viola-
tive of GATT, are the favored option over Article XIX5 because they
1 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
A7 T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (effective Jan. 1, 1948), art. XIX(1) [hereinafter GATI
1947].
2 OLIVIER LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATr MULTILATERAL TRADE SYS-
TEM 57 (1985).
3 The OECD Committee on Competition Law and Policy have neatly categorized the types
of action that fall under the rubric of VERs. They are the following:
1. Direct agreements or understandings between governments regarding the volume of ex-
ports. If these are formal agreements they are classified as Orderly Marketing Agreements
(OMAs). These types of agreements are not truly "voluntary" insofar as they cannot be unilat-
erally eliminated or modifiqd by the government of the exporting country. Voluntary restraint
arrangements (VRAs) are a form of OMAs that include industry participation.
2. Government sponsored arrangements among exporting firms that constrain exports be-
low a predetermined ceiling. An arrangement of this kind sponsored by the government of the
exporting country is a classic example of a voluntary export restraint agreement (VER);
3. Agreements or arrangements among exporting firms to limit exports undertaken without
government involvement, albeit most likely under the pressure of the importing (or exporting)
country's government. See OECD, OBSTACLES TO TRADE AND COMPETITION 17 (1993).
Kostecki adds more informal agreements to this list, which do not have any "formal pre-
commitments" as to the volume of imports but whose presence affect the competitive conditions
for trade. In this list, Kostecki includes "export forecasts," "consultation arrangements," and
"prudent marketing arrangements." Kostecki, infra note 25, at 425-26.
4 The objective of Article XI of the GATr is the general elimination of quantitative restric-
tions. VERs, are in effect, forms of quantitative restrictions which limit the volume of imports
and/or control their prices in the importing state because they restrict the normal flow of goods
from one country to another and disrupt the effect of market forces on trade. They violate the
principle of non-discrimination enshrined in Article I of the GATT since they are targeted selec-
tively at the producers of a particular country, and Article XIII:1 which provides that all quanti-
tative restrictions should be applied on a non-discriminatory basis.
5 For a systematic appraisal of the distinction between Article XIX and the VER, See Rein-
hard Quick, Exportselbstbeschralnkungen und Artikel XIX GATT, in Studien Zum Internation-
alen Wirtschaftsrecht und Atomenergierecht, Institut ftlr V61kerrecht der Universittt Gbttingen,
(1983). Basically, the difference between the VER and the safeguard measure is that the proce-
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are purportedly "voluntary" and more diplomatic; less complicated
and bureaucratic; swiftly satisfy the injured producers; and efficiently
avoid the numerous international and domestic legal obligations
which prevent immediate action.6 VERs are, in effect, selective trade
policy instruments that are primarily directed against developing
countries. They are considered inefficient forms of protection and
"remove the stimulus to restructure sunset industries."7 There is also
a tendency for these bilateral agreements to proliferate, as in the case
of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, an exceptional VER regime re-
moved from the GATF's ambit,8 as well as agreements covering steel,
footwear, automobiles and electronics. 9
The thesis of this article is that the safeguard measure and the
bilateral/unilateral VER are actually different sides of the same
coin-one within, the other without the GATI' framework; they are
industrial policy twins, one legitimate, the other illegitimate, the Jekyll
and Hyde of trade protectionism. They are Yin and Yang, both with
the same purpose. Formal considerations merely mask their unusual
kinship.
dural safeguards in Article XIX and the requirement for non-discrimination need not be com-
plied with.
6 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Grey Area Trade Policy and the Rule of Law, 22 J. WORLD
TRADE L., Apr. 1988, at 23, 27.
7 K.A. Koekkoek, The Developing Countries in The New GATT Round: Safeguards Revis-
ited, 1 INT'L TRADE J. 319, 328 (1987).
8 The international trade in textiles and clothing is regulated by the Multi-Fibre Arrange-
ment (MFA), practically a VER regime exempted from the GATT system. Sampson describes
the MFA in the following manner "The MFA is a multilaterally-negotiated arrangement whose
terms and conditions are to be respected by the signatory governments when negotiating bilater-
ally (on a government-to-government basis) volumes of trade in specific textile and clothing
products. The individual bilateral agreements contain conditions relating to the products (for
example, the base volumes of trade to which annual rates of growth are applied). The terms of
the agreements are notified to the Textile Surveillance Body (TSB) whose role it is to ensure
that the provisions of the multilateral arrangement are respected. The MFA is the only multilat-
eral arrangement in which governments agree to pursue policies to encourage internationally-
uncompetitive business to move into viable lines of production and to provide access to their
markets. See Gary P. Sampson, Pseudo-economics of the MFA-a Proposal for Reform, 10
WORLD ECON. 455, 456-57 (1987).
9 A complete discussion of the VERs in these other areas can be found in MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK ET AL, TRADE AND TRANSITIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ADJUSTMENT
POLICIES 42-76 (1990). The authors have this to say about the empirical evidence of the effects
of VERs, which they characterize as yielding "a very negative economic assessment": VERs
that restrict the number of units of imports in a given sector create incentives for foreign produ-
cers to move up-market to higher value-added, more profitable export lines. This has the per-
verse effect of leaving the domestic industry with a share of the product market where its
comparative disadvantage is greatest and induces greater import competition in product markets
where its comparative disadvantage is smallest. This trend has been evident in textiles, footwear
and automobiles. It can only be countered by ever more detailed import restrictions. Id. at 70.
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After a brief foray into the reasons why the VER is the preferred
mode of protection over the Article XIX emergency action provision,
the discussion in the article proceeds to the central portion of the
essay, which seeks to demythologize the GATI and propose a prag-
matic approach to the safeguard measure/VER dichotomy. Appropri-
ately argued to be purely hypothetical is the gulf that separates the
"rule-oriented" and "power-oriented" schools of thought in the
GATT debate. Dysfunctionality within the GATT system is analyzed
in the context of the escape clause of GAIT 1947. The third part of
the article analyzes the provisions of the new "Agreement of Safe-
guards found in the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations," and makes prognostica-
tions of its consequences on the fate of the safeguard measure/VER
problem.
I. SAFEGUARD MEASURES UNDER GAIT 1947
With respect to the intended thrust of the escape clause in the
original GATT, there is little controversy: (1) it offers short-term pro-
tection; (2) it is a rebus sic stantibus provision, because it applies to
circumstances unforeseen at the time of the agreement and which
could not have been predicted at that time;10 (3) it is a provisional
response to a change in the economic environment, both external and
internal;" and (4) it is supposed to enable a government to aid a local
industry which cannot successfully compete against certain imports.
Although not explicitly stated in Article XIX, it is generally accepted
that the suspension or withdrawal of obligations or concessions should
be applied on a nondiscriminatory basis.' 2 There are arguments,
though, that appear to justify selective safeguard measures.1 3
10 KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATr: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
99 (1970).
11 See OLIVIER LONG, supra note 2, at 59.
12 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS (1989); Mark Koulen, The Non-Discriminatory Interpretation of Article XIX GATT,
A Reply, 9 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 87 (1983).
13 See MARCO C.E.J. BRONCKERS, SELECTIVE SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN MULTILATERAL
TRADE RELATIONS 245 (1985). The main thrust of the argument in favor of selectivity in the
application of Article XIX lies in the contention that the importing country has the right to
contain "market disruption," and hence, can zero in on those suppliers who perform this "dis-
ruptive" action, without regard to the exporting country. For a full discussion of this justifica-
tion, See Brian Hindley, Voluntary Export Restraints and Article XIX of the GATT," in CURRENT
ISSUES IN COMMERCIAL POLICY AND DIPLOMACY (John Black & Brian Hindley, eds. 1979). In
the Tokyo Round negotiations, the European Community member advocated the concept of
"selective safeguards," i.e., the right to take emergency protective action against particular sup-
pliers, which would have violated the GATT's philosophy of non-discrimination. The develop-
108
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In a nutshell, the safeguard provision postpones the immediate
effect of the entry of competing products, granting the local producers
some leeway to adjust to the new situation from the structural point of
view, i.e., improve the competitiveness of their products during the
existence of the safeguard measure, or allow them a grace period dur-
ing which they can permanently shift production to products where
they have a better chance in the domestic market.14 The presumption
prevails that the imports that have become the subject of concern are
still "fair," but their increasing quantities cause "serious injury" to the
affected domestic producers.
Unlike antidumping legislation which targets "unfair" trade prac-
tices arising from price discrepancies in the exporter's home and ex-
port markets, safeguard measures are primarily "designed to deal
with exceptional situations," where the lower price of imports in ques-
tion "may merely reflect comparative advantage."'" Because of the
higher threshold of "serious injury" required to justify use of the es-
cape clause, as compared to antidumping's "material injury" stan-
dard,1 6 the safeguard measure at the outset appears to offer a lower
standard of protection. Moreover, antidumping measures, by their
very nature, can pinpoint particular countries or suppliers who prac-
tice "injurious" dumping. In contrast, the safeguard action should be
applied in a non-discriminatory manner.
Until the late seventies, a total of ninety-five safeguard actions
were recorded. 7 As of December 1, 1993, only 150 actions under Ar-
ticle XIX were reported to the GATT Secretariat, many of which have
already been terminated.' Generally, the value of trade affected by
such actions is relatively low.' 9 Since then, the safeguard clause has
been invoked with less and less frequency. Article XIX actions from
the European Community, for instance, have remained relatively rare.
In December 1992, only two Article XIX actions at the European
Community level remained (relating to dried grapes and processed
ing countries vehemently opposed the EEC propsal, and because of the impasse, no agreement
on an improved Safeguards Code could be reached.
14 See JACKSON, supra note 12, at 150.
15 J.F. BESELER, & A.N. WILLIAMS, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBsIDY: THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNMES 50 (1986).
16 Id.
17 Modalities of Application of Art. XIX: Note by the Secretariat. GATT Doc. LJ4679 at 10
(July 5, 1978).
18 GATT Secretariat, Analytical Index: Guide to GATT Law and Practice 500 (1994).
19 IRVING B. KRAVIS, DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 65 (1975).
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cherries), which was a reduction from the seven that existed in 1991.20
As of 1994, the United States had no Article XIX actions in effect. 21
III. THE VER: PREFERRED MODE OF PROTECTION
In the 1984 Report by the OECD Committee of Experts on
Restrictive Business Practices, five inherent "efficiency-reducing"
problems were noted in VERs and OMAs: (1) exporters are discrimi-
nated against, usually at the expense of the most competitive exporter;
(2) the adjustment process in the importing state is distorted; (3) the
"cartelization" of exports is encouraged, in effect reducing competi-
tion in both exporting and importing states; (4) resources may be
transferred from the importing to exporting country "when minimum
price provisions form part of the arrangement;" (5) consumers in the
importing country suffer the burden.22
Voluntary Export Restraints are usually agreed to by the affected
supplier/exporter when they are threatened with import relief meas-
ures in Article XIX, antidumping, countervailing duties, or unilateral
actions like the United States' Section 301 provisions. VERs are pre-
ferred because they appear to offer "better deals" and give the export-
ers at least some "bargaining leverage. '23 Part of the inducement for
the exporting country to conform to a VER is the possibility that the
exporting industry might be able to increase the price of its products
in the restricted market.24
VERs, although not strictly "voluntary,"'  as they are usually in-
stigated at the initiative of the importing country, nevertheless furnish
advantages to the erstwhile established exporters. Both the exporter,
20 1 TRADE POLICY REVIEW: EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 69-70 (General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade ed., 1993).
21 GAIT SECRETARIAT, TRADE POLICY REvIEw: UNITED STATES 73 (1994). The last re-
ported Article XIX import relief action of the United States, on speciality steel, was terminated
in 1989. Safeguard actions in the United States are covered by the Section 201 family of provi-
sions of the 1974 Trade Act, as amended. The requirements under this mechanism tend to be
more stringent than those under United States antidumping and countervailing regulations.
22 OECD, COMPETITION AND TRADE POLICIES: THEIR INTERACrION 12 (1984).
23 See Jan Tumlir, Emergency Protection Against Sharp Increases in Imports, in IN SEARCH
OF A NEw WORLD ECONOMIC ORDER 260 (H. Corbet & R. Jackson eds., 1990).
24 See DAVID GREENAWAY & BRIAN HINDLEY, WHAT BRITAIN PAYS FOR VOLUNTARY Ex-
PORT RESTRAINTS (Trade Policy Research Centre, Thames Essay No. 43, 1985).
25 Kostecki, in his authoritative article on VERs, differentiates the VERs from traditional
unilateral or bilateral import quotas by describing their "voluntary" nature in this manner: (1)
the exporting country has the right to withdraw from, or modify the VER on their own volition;
(2) the VER is basically controlled and enforced at the exporting country's border. See Michael
Kostecki, Export Restraint Arrangements and Trade Liberalization, 10 WORLD ECON. 425-26
(1987).
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and their respective foreign government, gain from the distribution of
rents that would have gone to the importing government had a tariff
been imposed, provided they agree to limit exports.26 It is actually a
quid pro quo arrangement: on the one hand, the importing state is
assured that only a limited number of products will enter their mar-
kets without having to worry about the GAT' rules on quantitative
restrictions,27 and on the other, the exporter is assured that a certain
quantity of his or her product will be sold in that particular market.
Not only does this "informal" agreement "avoid open confrontations"
possible with the GATT system of multilateral tariffs and quotas, but
it also encourages collusion and eliminates the need for retailiation
from both sides.28 Since the foreign government and exporting firms
"voluntarily' 29 participate in the process, they are not likely to contest
the VER on the ground that it violates the GATT.30
A perfect example of this "collaborative environment" that actu-
ally backfired on the instigating country were the 1981 Japanese vol-
untary restrictions on its automobile exports to the United States,
which benefited both the Japanese and United States automobile in-
dustries.31 Apart from the GAIT and United States antitrust viola-
tions the VER engendered, the automobile VER prejudiced United
States consumers by causing an increase in the price of all new cars,
and gave American and foreign automobile makers billions of dollars
in unearned profits. But this VER led to a chain reaction that drew
other states to implement more VERs. Due to the limited number of
cars the Japanese could export, they opted to sell higher-priced cars to
the upper end of the United States market for better profit margins.
26 Edward John Ray, Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs and the Rise in
Non-Tariff Barriers, 8 Nw. J. Ir'L L. & Bus. 285, 307 (1987).
27 See GATT 1947, supra note 1, arts. XI, XII, and XIII.
28 Ray, supra note 26, at 307.
29 A VER may be treated as "voluntary" in the sense that the established exporter would
rather be able to maintain a certain share of the importing country's export market than to be
completely shut out by Article XIX restrictions. But it can likewise be argued that exporters do
not restrain the volume of their exports "voluntarily," but are actually "coerced" to do so under
the threat of the cumbersome Article XIX procedure or other GATT-legal measures such as
antidumping and countervailing duties, which are applied with impunity by some contracting
parties. The VER thus becomes a "better-than-nothing" alternative to the exporter. The other
point to consider is that the two parties who enter into a VER usually do not do so from the
same position of strength; one party usually has most of the cards stacked in its favor. To charac-
terize the weaker party's "self-administration" of its own exports as "voluntary" is like wringing
a second confession from an innocent party.
30 OECD, supra note 22, at 21.
31 See Michael William Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary Restraint on Automobile Exports:
An Abandonment of the Free Trade Principles of the GATT and the Free Market Principles of
United States Antitrust Laws, 27 HARVARD INT'L LAW J. 99, 150.
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This allowed the Japanese to penetrate a segment of the market here-
tofore closed to them. Furthermore, the Japanese firms diverted their
excess production capacity to other markets where they sold their
automobiles more competitively,3 2 causing other states, such as mem-
ber states of the European Community, to seek similar import re-
straints.33 The cartelization of VERs, as demonstrated in this
particular example, may actually improve the position of the foreign
producer who participates in the VER-induced cartel, rather than
competing under normal market conditions.34
VERs pose the strongest threat to the interests of developing
countries. As in the case of the safeguard measure, the main targets
of VERs would be those countries with a "rapidly changing structure
of exports," coupled with high economic growth. Developed coun-
tries would be the major initiators of VERs because they are the ones
who are losing competitive advantage in certain areas of manufactures
which the more successful LDCs have penetrated.3 Non-tariff meas-
ures, particularly VERs and OMAs, have been disproportionately di-
rected to manufactured exports from developing countries,
disregarding the differential and preferential treatment to them ac-
corded by the GATTr. 36 Hindley, however, persuasively contends that
VERS may be the "necessary evil" for developing countries where the
latter can make the best of the current sad state of developed country
trade policy.
Due to their non-transparent nature, data on VERs is scarce.
Thus, only general aggregate international trade data may provide us
with a rough picture of the growing prevalence of non-tariff barriers
(NTBs), VERs being one of the more popular NTBs. Developed
countries have the highest share of imports covered by NTBs. As of
1986, the European Community (followed closely by the United
States) and Japan had the highest share of NTB protection on their
imports. 37 In 1987, Kostecki calculated that in the mid-1980s, no less
than ten percent of world trade, and about twelve percent of non-fuel
trade, were covered by VERs. Of the 137 export-restraint agreements
32 Id. at 150.
33 See BRONCKERS, supra note 13, at 123-29.
34 MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., supra note 9, at 71.
35 Brian Hindley, GATT Safeguards and Voluntary Export Restraints: What are the Interests
of Developing Countries?, 1 WORLD BANK REV. 689 (1987).
36 See Gary P. Sampson, Non-Tariff Barriers Facing Developing Country Exports, in DEVEL-
OPING COUNTRIES AND THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM 171, 184 (John Whalley ed., 1989).
37 Sam Laird & Alexander Yeats, Nontariff Barriers of Developed Countries, 1966-1986, Fi-
NANCE AND DEVELOPMENT Mar. 1989, at 12, 12-13.
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he reported for the period 1986-1987, sixty-eight protected the Euro-
pean Community market, forty-five the United States market, and ten
the Canadian market.3 8
The latest available figures on VERs are from the GATT Secreta-
riat's latest Report on the Developments in the Trading System, cov-
ering the period from September, 1988 to February, 1989. Very few of
these arrangements have actually been notified to the GATT Secreta-
riat. Product categories affected by these VERs are concentrated
mainly in the textile and clothing sectors (seventy-seven agreements,
twenty-nine of which have been notified to the Textile Surveillance
Board as part of the Multi-Fiber Agreement); agricultural and food
products (sixty-four agreements); steel and steel products (fifty-two
agreements); electronic products (thirty-two agreements);
automobiles and other transport equipment (twenty-one agreements);
footwear (seventeen agreements); and machine tools (fourteen agree-
ments). Most of the VERs protect the European Community market
or one of its member states, or the United States-the two account for
four-fifths of the VER measures listed.39
IV. THE NEED FOR A REALISTIC PERSPECTIVE
There is no question that VERs and the other forms of bilateral
agreements undermine the liberal and "legal" trade regime that the
GAT' seeks to perpetuate. Their widespread acceptance does not
demonstrate that the multilateral obligations assumed by the GATT
parties have been modified.40 The principal factor that helped estab-
lish the GATT and the liberal trading regime was the dominant eco-
nomic and military power of the United States after World War II.
The United States' interests set the stage for trade liberalization, nota-
bly in the sphere of tariff concessions.41 But this initial boost towards
liberalization depended largely on the economic hegemony of the
United States. With the decline of United States economic power vis-
a-vis Europe, and later, in relation to East Asia, non-tariff barriers
38 Kostecki, supra note 25, at 428-29.
39 GATT SECRETARIAT, Developments in the Trading System, L16530 at 91 (1989).
40 See discussion of Hasan Moinuddin, Grey Area Trade Policies, in FOREIGN TRADE IN THE
PRESENT AND A NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 197, 200 (1988).
41 See Robert E. Baldwin, The Changing Nature of of U.S. Trade Policy since World War II,
in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF RECENT U.S. TRADE POLICY 5,5-7 (Robert Baldwin &
Anne Krueger eds., 1984).
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outside the GATT became more and more popular, with the use of
discriminatory trade restraints increasing.42
Economic theory confirms that such VER agreements are ex-
tremely disadvantageous to consumers, reduce efficient competition,
and harm economic welfare as a whole. Prices remain artificially high,
and there is no guarantee that the protected domestic firms will make
the necessary adjustments to restore competitiveness to their prod-
ucts. In the 1983 European Community-Japan VER restricting Japa-
nese exports of video recorders into the European Community, the
level of exports was varied according to the sales of European Com-
munity producers, in hopes of increasing the output of indigenous
Philips-Grundig sales of VCRs, and of protecting the V2000 Philips
format over the VHS and Betamax formats of the Japanese firms. By
aligning Japanese VCR prices with the factory prices of European
producers, the VER merely induced prices of all VCRs in the Euro-
pean Community to increase. Neither did it encourage Philips-
Grundig to increase their output, nor prevent the eventual demise of
the less competitive V2000 format.43
In defiance of these undisputed economic facts, governments, as
well as private firms, continually resort to the VER and its various
permutations, shunning the reasonable legal avenues available to
them under the escape clause. It is true that the demands of powerful
domestic producers drown out the influential, but no less valid, com-
plaints of consumers, due to protectionist biases in decision-making in
market economies.' Petersmann regards this as a "constitutional fail-
ure of representative democracy."'45 But if safeguard protection does
provide a safety valve for injured local firms, then why is it not ex-
ploited? Is political expediency the only cause of its early demise? If
the VER is truly legally and economically despicable as it is pictured
to be, why is this alternative preferred by the developed countries in
general and by most of the targeted exporters? Why is the VER con-
sistently preferred by a country such as the United States, which was
instrumental in creating the GAIT rules on safeguards it now
circumvents?
42 Gernot Klepper, The Next GATT Round: Bilateralism versus Multilateralism, 21 INTER-
ECONOMICS 236, 236-37.
43 Brian Hindley, EC Imports of VCRs from Japan, A Costly Precedent, 20 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 168, 179, 182.
4See ERNsT-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 183-208 (1988).
45 Id. at 205.
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The answers lie in the fact that the original Article XIX provision
in the GAT of 1947, and the improved version in the Agreement on
Safeguards in the Final Act of GATT 1994, exemplify the inherent
contradictions in the GAT system of liberal trade. As aptly put by
the Institute of International Economics, "Safeguards provisions pose
something of a paradox. Although they allow the imposition of trade
restrictions, safeguards also make it possible to arrive at agreements
to liberalize trade that otherwise could not have been achieved."46 It
can likewise be argued that the equivocal mercantilistic parameters of
the safeguard provision-mistakenly perceived as beneficial for a
multilateral system-have helped spawn the growing popularity of bi-
lateral agreements.
The real issue in the safeguard measures/VER chasm is one of
declining competitiveness in the sunset industries mainly found in the
developed world; VERs are often negotiated between parties with dis-
parate levels of economic and/or political power. One party always
enters the trade equation from a position of strength. The weaker
party, however, is rewarded by cornering at least a coveted segment of
the export market. Smaller or less established exporters, (the so-
called "innocent bystanders"), are often left out in the cold because of
their lack of influence in both the internecine political tug-of-war in
the importing state, and the international trade negotiations transpir-
ing between the parties involved in the VER. In this interlocking of
interests, however, the efficient producer is nevertheless "punished"
for its comparative advantage, while the "innocent bystander" could
be penalized for being "out of the loop."
Even with the pernicious economic effects resulting from VERs,
affected manufacturers and their cooperating governments will always
seek the most painless, and thus more strategic way to check competi-
tion from importers. If the Article XIX escape clause has been
scarcely resorted to, it is indicative that it does not perform its enunci-
ated function as the "safety valve" for injured producers; the diversion
to bilateralism may be attributed precisely to the failure of the escape
clause to provide a viable option. A multilateral approach always
presents itself to be the ideal. But as long as the protectionist interests
of one state can be "sufficiently persuasive" to induce another state to
modify its export behavior, informal arrangements will always be, for
the most part, the tempting alternative. Because VERs, in general,
46 Colleen Hamilton & John Whalley, Safeguards, in COMPLETING THE URUGUAY ROUND:
A RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE GAIT TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 79, 80 (Jeffrey Schott
ed., 1990).
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have not been regulated by the GATT system,47 they have been insu-
lated from legal review.48
This is not to say that VERs, VRAs and OMAs should be con-
doned. Rather, it is because the safeguard clause has not lived up to
its promise to offer an "escape" that the problem of "serious injury"
to domestic producers could not be controlled and regulated within
the GATT discipline. In other words, the significance of the escape
clause and its further development in the Uruguay Round lies in a
pragmatic analysis of why it has often been avoided, or evaded, and
not in the ritual of reiterating its virtue due to its avowed consistency
with the GATT framework. The growing eminence of "gray area"
trade policies is therefore more of a strategic response4 9 to actual and
perceived deficiencies in the safeguard procedure than an innate ad-
vantage in the VER.
V. DEMYSTIFYING THE GATT
A. The "All-or-Nothing" School
The perceived safeguard measure/VER dichotomy is a micro-
cosm of the flawed all-or-nothing approach to GAT law. Before
delving into this central issue, there is a need to discard certain
preconceived notions of the GAT system which have been practi-
cally immortalized by repetition and regurgitation in numerous
writings.
There is no doubt that the GAIT regime is the sole existing legal
framework for international trade.50 An arbitrary line, however, has
been drawn to distinguish the function from the significance of GATT
rules. A clear demarcation divides those who defend the "rule-ori-
ented" perspective and those who espouse the "power-oriented" ap-
proach.5' The former "legalist" school of thought believes that the
GATr can be considered a legal system in itself, designed to regulate
trade relations between states, with corresponding legal responsibili-
47 The exception is the textile industry, which has been regulated by the Multi-Fibre Agree-
ment. See Sampson, supra note 8, at 456-57.
48 See Lochmann, supra note 31, at 153.
49 The use of the term "strategic" here merely refers to the constant weaving in and out of
the GATT system, i.e., shifting allegiances to GATT-consistent and GATT-inconsistent solutions
to trade problems. There is no reference to the strategic game theory approaches in economics
that focuses on the impact of restraints under conditions of imperfect competition.
50 See Guy Ladreit de Lacharriere, The Legal Framework for International Trade, in THE
LEUTWILER REPORT, TRADE POLICIES FOR A BETTER FUTURE 95 (1987).
51 This classification has coined by Prof. John H. Jackson. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYsTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989).
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ties and obligations.52 A greater degree of fairness, stability and pre-
dictability, as well as the evolution of procedures for compromise, are
the strongest arguments for conforming to a set of rules in interna-
tional trade.53 To the legalists, those who cling to the "power-ori-
ented" treatment of the GAfT reserve "too great a role for
negotiation of disputes," with an alarming tendency towards "political
compromise. '54
A branch of the legalist school accords GATT an even loftier
"constitutional function," whereby the principles of non-discrimina-
tion, transparency and dispute settlement act as "mutually agreed in-
ternational legal constraints on the broad trade-policy powers of
governments in order to outlaw economically inefficient and harmful
trade-policy instruments. '5 5 Since GATT rules represent the "liberal
constitutional principles" in democratic societies,56 the trade order es-
poused by GAIT should be transposed to national laws that govern
the determination of each state's respective domestic trade policies.57
In sum, observance of GATT rules guarantees the "stability of
the conditions of trade and levels of protection as well as a limitation
of the means of protection to the relatively least costly ones." 58 The
question at this point arises: if the GAIT truly contains the most ac-
ceptable and efficient set of rules for international trade relations,
then why are GATT rules unashamedly waylaid by the United States
and the European Community 59 the economic powers who have had
a direct hand in its formulation?
The "pragmatist," power-oriented group, on the other hand,
maintains that the GATT merely "provides a process through which
52 See JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS (1986); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM, LAW AND POLICY
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (1989); JAMES FAWCEr, LAW AND POWER IN IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1982).
53 See John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 93, 98-101 (1978).
54 Philip R. Trimble, International Trade and the "Rule of Law," 83 MICH. L. REV. 1016,1018
(1985) (reviewing JoHN H. JACKSON ET AL, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES (1984)).
55 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Economic, Legal and Political Function of the Principle of Non-
discrimination, 9 WORLD ECON. 113, 119 (1986).
56 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Verfassungsrechtliche Grundprobleme bei der rechtlichen
Regelung der Instrumente der Handelspolitik, in ZOLLE, VERBRAUCHERSTEUERN,
EUROPAISCHES MARKTORDNUNGSRECHT 5-31 (Heinrich Wilhelm Kruse ed., 1988).
57 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Handelspolitik als Verfassungsproblem, 39 ORDO 239-254.
58 Jan Tumlir, GATT Rules and Community Law-A Comparison of Economic and Legal
Functions, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT 1, 8 (Meinhard Hilf et. al. eds., 1986).
59 See Biswajit Dhar, The Decline of Free Trade and U.S. Trade Policy Today, 26 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 133 (1992).
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trade problems are negotiated and compromised within a general
framework of rules. ' 60 As there is always a political factor behind the
law, rules cannot be justified by simply explaining their economic ra-
tionale or normative standard.6' The extreme "rule of law" position
"assumes an impassable gulf between law and politics."'6
Long, a former GATT Director-General, acknowledges the limi-
tations of the law in the context of international trade relations be-
cause there are "inherent difficulties" in the regulation of something
as fluid and vigorous as world trade.63 He asserts that "[w]ith a deteri-
oration in the economic environment, national political constraints
often oblige governments to act outside a legal framework created in
different economic circumstances."' The flexible procedures in the
renegotiation of tariff concessions, the exceptions to the prohibition of
quantitative restrictions, and the safeguard clause which permits the
suspension of GATT obligations confirm that the contracting parties
sought to avoid undue rigidity in the implementation of certain GAIT
provisions, in order to render compliance more feasible both politi-
cally and in terms of trade policy.65 In brief, the pragmatic approach
considers the GATT constellation of "rules" as merely a means to an
end, a starting point for discussions, a forum for reconciling opposing
trade interests. Some have even advanced the proposition that trade
policy should be decided by duly elected officials and bureaucrats who
are sensitive to the interests of the constituencies affected, rather than
by private litigants and international judges who are beholden to theo-
retically fixed rules.66
In reality, this rule versus power-oriented categorization of the
functionality of GATr law carries not much practical relevance. Of
course, for multilateral negotiations, dispute settlement and academic
scholarship it is imperative that what is "legal" be defined, so as to be
able to determine what is not. But the fact of the matter is, states
perpetually flip-flop between invoking the "divine status" of the
GATT at one point, and resorting to bilateral agreements or unilateral
measures at another point-policy orientations dependent on the exi-
60 See Trimble, supra note 54, at 1017.
61 Daniel K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth, and the International Economic Order, 26 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 533 (1985).
62 Daniel K. Tarullo, Foreign Trade in the Present and a New International Economic Order,
85 AM. J. OF INT'L L. 245, 247 (1991) (reviewing Detlev Chr. Dicke and Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann).
63 Long, supra note 2, at 7.
64 Long, supra note 2, at 60.
65 Long, supra note 2, at 61.
66 See Trimble, supra note 54, at 1029.
The Safeguard Measure/VER Dilemma
15:105 (1994)
gencies of the moment. This seesawing between these two apparent
extremes in different trade situations cannot be classified strictly as
the pragmatist's approach. GATT regulations are quietly side-
stepped when they cannot accomplish a particular need at a certain
time. However, they are still complied with and relied upon when it is
in the interest of the concerned state to do so.
It would be erroneous to pigeonhole such ingenuity in trade pol-
icy as "power-oriented;" that is to say, that international trade regula-
tions are consigned to being simply initial bases for discussion and
ruled by the relative strengths of the negotiating parties. Neither is a
"justified disobedience" to GATT rules being advocated here. In the
evaluation of rules, the actual status of international trade relations
must be acknowledged. Strategy determines whether a contracting
party conducts trade relations within the GATT framework or outside
it. It can be suggested that it is this complex "interplay" between
GATT-consistent and GATT-contradictory measures and policies that
actually constitutes the realistic legal-political-economic structure cir-
cumscribing the whole gamut of international trade relations. To use
Professor Jackson's christened term in a wholly different context, an
"interface" 67 endures between the GATT framework and its mirror
image exterior to it-not a stark legal/extra-legal division, but a con-
tinuum based on strategic considerations.
It is hardly a surprise to see nations-be they the economic
heavyweights who dictate the legal spiels, so to speak, or the aspiring
lightweights gagged by their lack of political or economic influence-
passionately refer to GATT provisions with respect to one issue, but
in another breath, engage in non-transparent bilateral agreements/
unilateral instruments beyond the GATT's scope. The result of the
decision to opt for or against a GATT-derived solution, although pre-
sumably advantageous to the state which selects the solution, may
sometimes produce unexpected consequences. As illustrated earlier,
Japan responded to the American 1984 VER on automobiles by modi-
fying its products for the higher-end of the market. Thus, the Japa-
67 Professor Jackson used this term in his discussion on antidumping laws. Jackson adopts
the "interface" analogy by referring to the difficulties involved in making two computers with
different systems to work, contending that an "interface mechanism" may be necessary "to allow
different economic systems to trade together harmoniously." See JACKSON & DAVEY, supra
note 52, at 650-651. "Interface," in this article, is an attempt to picture managing and bridging
the relationship between the GATT "rule of law" world with the ostensibly GATT "illegal"
parallel universe of bilateralism, unilateralism and protectionism.
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nese firms were able to increase the prices of their cars while
remaining within the imposed volume ceilings. 68
VERs-which mainly cover sensitive areas such as steel, clothing,
textiles, agricultural products, cars, electronic products and machine
tools-have not automatically prevented a loss of jobs in the protect-
ing countries. For instance, employment in the steel industry fell by
forty-two percent in the European Community and fifty-four percent
in the United States between 1973 and 1984 although VERs in steel
were in place. The OECD estimates that between 20,000 and 35,000
jobs in the United States automobile industry were protected by
VERs on automobiles in 1982, but there were redundancies of more
than 200,000.69 Domestic producers stand little to gain in the long
run, unless they are given additional protection against other competi-
tors-generating layer upon layer of protection. When the United
States forced Japan to sign an Orderly Marketing Arrangement
(OMA) for television sets in 1977, the import market share of Korean
and Taiwanese TVs zoomed from fifteen percent to fifty percent in a
single year.7 °
The continuing attraction of the "gray area" trade measure con-
firms that the GAIT system can often help, but not satisfactorily re-
solve, the balancing of interests involved in trade policy-making on
the domestic level.7 ' VERs will definitely decline in importance,
when both fact and perception affirm that the GATT mechanisms,
particularly Article XIX, offer sufficient flexibility to resolve situa-
tions of serious injury to domestic producers.72
It is not true that the GATT system is "eroding," and that there
has been a growing disenchantment with the legalistic perspective.73
On the contrary, the element of strategy has played a major role in the
operation of the system since time immemorial; attention has only
68 Charles Coyles & Steven Dunaway, The Cost of Trade Restrain; IMF Staff Paper (March
1987).
69 OECD Observer, The High Cost of Protection, No. 150, 5 (1988).
70 Clemens F.J. Boonekamp, Voluntary Export Restraints, FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT
Dec. 1987, at 2, 5.
71 Prof. Kenneth W. Abbott argues that international trade law does promote satisfactory
resolution of the "Prisoner's Dilemma" in the context of domestic decision-making in the area of
trade. See Kenneth W. Abbott, The Trading Nation's Dilemma: The Functions of the Law of
International Trade, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 501, 503-04 (1985).
72 See Horst G. Krenzler, Exportselbstbeschrankungen-ein aktalles Problem der Handel-
spolitik der Europaiischen Gemeinschaft, 2 EUROPARECHT 177, 181 (1977).
73 See the well-reasoned proponent of the rule-oriented line of thinking in Miquel Montana i
Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International Trade Dis-
putes, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 103 (1993).
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been given to the practical effects of the GATT in the last two decades
because the economic world order has changed.
B. The "Liberalization-Mercantilization" Syndrome
Existing parallel to the illusory rule/power distinction in the ap-
preciation of GATT law is the myth that the GAIT promotes only the
liberalization of trade. Peculiar to the GAIT orientation is the forced
marriage of liberal and mercantilistic components in the GATT sys-
tem, creating internal contradictions in the entire GAT system as a
whole.74 An economist has rightly dubbed this coupling the "liberali-
zation-mercantiism" syndrome.75 The GAT supports a legal struc-
ture composed of provisions ensuring the liberalization of trade, but at
the same time, allows numerous exceptions nullifying each of these
fundamental principles.76 These fatal protectionist "qualifiers" neu-
tralize the liberalizing thrust of the GATT and encourage participat-
ing states to more, rather than less protectionism.77 At the outset,
exceptions should be integrated with the underlying philosophy of the
GAIT regulations, and as a corollary, should facilitate compliance
with such rules. Unfortunately, the provisos in the key GATT provi-
sions go beyond corrective measures, and have the effect of offering
wide-ranging protectionist opportunities, legitimized by their inclusion
in the GATT.78
Article XIX is a case in point. The safeguard procedure proceeds
from the assumption that free trade may injure, in certain instances, a
liberalized economy. But it is clear from the content of the Article
that the protection from injury favors the production sector of the af-
fected economy.79 This observation holds true for all the protective
measures available in the GAT regime.80 The protection allowed by
the provision discourages structural adjustment and adaptation to the
74 Jock A. Finlayson & Mark W. Zacher, The GATT and the Regultion of Trade Barriers:
Regime Dynamics and Functions, 35 INT'L ORG. 561, 593 (1981).
75 See Detlev Lorenz, Ursachen und Konseqtanzen des Neomerkantilismus, in INTERNATrO-
NALE ANPASSUNOSPROZESSE 15 (A. Woll ed., 1981).
76 Horst Werner, Das GATT Heute: Die Ausnahme als Regel, in DIE NEUORDNUNG DES
GATFI': REGELN FOR DEN WELTWIRTSCHAF-LiCHEN STRUKTURWANDEL uND TECHNOLOGY-
TRANSFER 43 (1987).
77 Josef Molsberger & Angela Kotios, Ordnungspolitiche Defizite des GATT, 41 ORDO 93
(1990).
78 Among these are the Balance of Payment exceptions in Articles XIV and XVIII; the sup-
port for a protectionist agricultural policy in Article XI(2)(c), and subsidies for agricultural prod-
ucts in Article XVI.
79 RICHARD SENIT, GAT: SYSTEM DER WELTHANDELSORDNUNa 240 (1986).
80 HEINER FLASSBECK, FREIHANDEL, GATT UND DAS INTERNATIONALE WAEHRUNGSSYS-
TEM 14 (1985).
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increased imports. Moreover, it preserves the status of inefficient
manufacturers, regardless of the relative positions in the international
market economy.8' The mercantilistic component of the GATT
serves as a "framework for exercising producer's property rights."8 2
The GATT therefore makes no provision for special rules to reward
those who have the comparative advantage to succeed in the liberal
trading system it sought to create. 3 The "gainers" from trade do not
have the same legal standing as the "losers.1
8 4
Petersmann posits that states often concede to protectionist
forces despite their agreement on the economically harmful effects of
protection because of the bias in the domestic decision-making proce-
dures of governments. The political influence of producers is much
stronger than those of the consumer public and the other sectors of
the economy.85 This contention would have been wholly correct if the
GATT itself did not provide the mechanisms that sanction the produ-
cers' priority in the economy. In the escape clause and, among others,
in the antidumping sections,8 6 customs union and free trade area pro-
visions, protectionism is grafted on the GAT[ corpus itself. Since the
GATT was forced to walk the tightrope between these mercantilistic
concessions and the multilateral philosophy in trade relations it es-
pouses, the suspension of obligations normally requires giving written
notice to the contracting parties, especially to those whose products
are affected, to pave the way for consultations regarding the proposed
safeguard action. 7 The real paradox here is that the GATT-bound
protectionist component spawned the non-GATT spinoffs (such as
VERs, OMAs, Voluntary Import Expansions (VIEs), preferences of
domestic firms for government procurement, cartels, variable import
levies and the like), clearly because the GATT versions did not go far
enough.
81 Molsberger & Kotios, supra note 77, at 97.
82 See Gary C. Hufbauer's Comment, reviewing J. Michael Finger, Protectionist Rules and
Internationalist Discretion in the Making of National Trade Policy, in NEW INSTITUTIONAL AR-
RANGEMENTS FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 310, 324 (Hans Juergen Vosgerau ed., 1989).
83 Michael Finger, Protectionist Rules and Internationalist Discretion in the Making of Na-
tional Trade Policy, in NEW INSTrrUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY 310,
322 (Hans Juergen Vosgerau ed., 1989).
84 Id.
85 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Protektionismus als Ordnungsproblem und Rechtsproblen, 47
RABELS ZErrscHRiFT 478, 483-84, 500 (1983).
86 See RAINIER BIERWAGEN, GATI ARTICLE VI AND THE PROTECrIONIST BIAS IN ANTI-
DUMPING LAWS (1990).
87 GATF 1947, supra note 1, at art. XIX(2).
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This "structural deficit" which the custom and tradition of the
GAIT system perpetuates, undermines the very rule-based system it
doggedly pursues. The comment that obedience to the GATT has be-
come outmoded because the world has changed profoundly since the
GATT's inception is a gross oversimplification; if this were the case,
then every change in the economic enviroment would warrant a
change in international trade rules. GAT law would then be a mere
phantom of the trade opera. The continuous negotiations in various
tariff rounds, the adoption of various codes covering certain ambigu-
ous aspects of the original agreement, and the evolution of dispute
settlement practice exhibit the desire of the contracting parties to fine-
tune the main agreement to changing economic and political condi-
tions.18 While the numerous exclusions, exceptions and derogations in
the 1947 Agreement have undoubtedly substantially altered whatever
semblance of "symmetry"-the balancing of benefits and conces-
sions-the GATT possesses,8 9 the license to turn to quantitative re-
strictions in cases of "serious injury" to domestic producers
fundamentally impaired whatever "initial symmetry" 9 it ought to
have had.
C. The Escape Clause: GAT Ambivalence in the Concrete
Regardless of the careful wording of Article XIX in the 1947
Agreement to conform to the general GATT principles, the subtext of
the article clearly involves the loss of the competitive advantage of af-
fected domestic producers with respect to products identical or similar
to, or directly competitive with, products manufactured by them. The
three elements necessary to trigger the concession in this Article-the
"unforeseen developments," the effect of the obligations incurred
under the Agreement, and most important, the contracting party's do-
mestic producer's experiencing or being threatened by "serious in-
jury"-indicate that the rationale of the provision is to come to the
rescue of producers who are unable to stave off the imports that com-
pete with their products. When these three requirements are fulfilled,
the contracting party may suspend its obligations under the GAT.91
88 Andrew Farran, The Interplay of Law and Economics in International Trade Regulation, in
ISSUES IN WORLD TRADE POLICY: GATT AT THE CROSSROADS 193, 195-96 (R.H. Snape ed.,
1986).
89 Id. at 200.
90 Id.
91 GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XIX(1)(a).
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These obligations may either be in the form of tariff concession with-
drawals or quantitative restrictions.9a
The rationale for the escape clause lies mainly with the concept of
"serious injury," which is not clearly defined in the GATT of 1947.
The absolute increase of imports is not necessary to justify a safeguard
measure; it is sufficient that conditions exist "as to cause or threaten
serious injury" 93 that would merit the suspension of obligations. The
latitude the Article gives to the contracting party affected is theoreti-
cally broad: the mere threat of "serious injury" opens the door to the
use of the escape clause. Although the Article does not explicitly
identify the party who is to make the determination of "serious in-
jury," it appears logical that it would be the affected contracting party,
because it is such party that has the interest in exploiting the safe-
guard measure. Existing and actual, rather than potential domestic
producers, seem to be the producers referred to in the provision, as
the imports must "cause or threaten" serious injury.94
There is no mention in the old Article XIX as to which party
must assume the burden of proof in the establishment of "serious in-
jury." Such a task may have been substituted by the requirement for a
consultation procedure. In circumstances where a compromise be-
tween the parties is not reached, the affected exporting party may sus-
pend its own obligations, or substantially equivalent concessions vis-a-
vis the party invoking the escape clause, not later than ninety days
after the safeguard action has been taken.95 Other GATT members
who may have a substantial interest as exporters of the product con-
cerned should be part of the consultation process.96
The bias in favor of the producer's interest prevails when the Ar-
ticle nevertheless allows the safeguard action to be taken provisionally
without prior consultation, i.e., in critical circumstances where delay
would cause damage which would be difficult to repair.9 7 Consulta-
tion, however, is required immediately after taking such action,
although in practical terms, the safeguard measure is already fait ac-
compli. Furthermore, if there is still disagreement among the con-
tracting parties, the party wishing to employ the safeguard action may
92 DAM, supra note 10, at 105-06.
93 GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XIX(1)(a).
94 See discussion of Article XIX in Patrizio Merciai, Safeguard Measures in GATT, 15 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 41 (1981).
95 GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XIX(3)(a).
96 GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XIX(2).
97 GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XIX(2).
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still do so.98 But in this particular instance, the affected exporting
country can, within a flexible time frame, retaliate by suspending obli-
gations under the GAIT, or grant substantially equivalent conces-
sions.99 Among the retaliatory actions are quantitative restrictions,
tariff increases, etc. Many commentators observed early on that the
prospect of retaliation and paying compensation dampen enthusiasm
for emergency action under the GAIT framework."°
Taken as a whole, the crux of the problem is that it concedes the
upper hand to the producer, yet imposes a rather cumbersome, if not
burdensome, consultation procedure that turns away the potential
users of the clause. It might be claimed that the tedious step-by-step
procedure acts as the counterweight to the advantage given to the pro-
ducer and adds a multilateral dimension to the whole process. How-
ever, the multilateral facet in this Article is weak because emergency
action without prior consultation is still permitted in "critical circum-
stances." In addition, the possibility of retaliation may actually dis-
courage contracting parties from availing themselves of this GATT
protectionist alternative. From the other end, the formalities required
in the consultation procedure dilute the levelling effect of retaliation.
Experience has also shown that the escape clause has neither lived up
to its ordained function as a safety valve for the protectionist forces,
nor guaranteed effective retaliation for the prejudiced exporting
party. If this emergency action provision could not provide the theo-
retically temporary adjustment mechanism to the producer, or en-
courage structural adjustment during its operation, perhaps it should
have been done away with altogether and the VER system regulated
as far as practicable.
VI. THE AGREEMENT ON SAFEGUARDS OF GATT 1994: Two
STEPS FORWARD BUT ONE STEP BACKWARD
A. A General Overview
In all respects, the revised Article XIX that makes its appearance
in the Agreement of Safeguards in the GAIT of 1994 refines the cate-
gorical but somewhat discretionary wording of the 1947 text. The cri-
98 GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XIX(3)(a).
99 GATT 1947, supra note 1, art. XIX(3)(a).
100 See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAw OF GATF (1969); Gerard & Victo-
ria Curzon, The Management of Trade Relations in the GATT, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1959-1971, 148, 223 (1976); Thomas R. Graham, Re-
forming the International Trading System: The Tokyo Round Negotiations in the Final Stage, 12
CORNELL INT'L L.. 1, 24 (1979).
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teria for safeguard actions have been rendered more specific and the
consultation procedure strengthened. The duration of the safeguard
measures is now more limited, ensuring that the overriding objective
of adjustment is not sidestepped. This bodes well for the multilateral
process the new rules hope to revitalize. Numerous sections in the
Agreement demand full transparency in every phase leading to the
application of the safeguard measure, whether in its provisional form
or in its principal construction.10 1
The new Agreement brooks no compromise by neither relaxing
the conditions for the application of the escape clause nor bringing the
VERs into the GATr fold, °2 indicative of the resolve to underscore
the principle of multilateralism. For sure, the most vital section in the
1994 Agreement on Safeguards is the prohibition of Voluntary Export
Restraints, Orderly Marketing Arrangements and other forms of
bilateral agreements,0 3 and the obligatory phasing out of similar
existing agreements according to a set timetable presented to the
Committee on Safeguards'04 by the members concerned.10 5 These
timetables shall provide that the VERs, OMAs and the like should be
phased out or made to conform to GAIT 1994 within four years of
the effective date of the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement.
101 GATT SECRETARIAT, Agreement on Safeguards, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, THE LEGAL TEXTS 315, arts. 3(1) and 4(2)(c) (1994)
[hereinafter Safeguards].
102 The Agreement, however, brings all the existing "gray area" measures under its control.
See Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 11(1)(b).
103 See Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 11(1)(b). Among the measures specifically included
under the scope of the prohibited bilateral agreements are export moderation, export-price or
import-price monitoring systems, export or import surveillance, compulsory import cartels and
discretionary export or import licensing schemes, any of which afford protection.
104 Under the new Agreement, the Committee on Safeguards, which shall be composed of
any member willing to serve in it, shall have a number of important functions, among them:
(1) to monitor and report annually to the Council for Trade in Goods on the general implemen-
tation of the Agreement and make recommendations; (2) upon the request of an affected mem-
ber, to find out if the procedural requirements of the Agreement have been complied with in
connection with a safeguard measure and report its findings to the Council for Trade in Goods;
(3) to assist members in the consultation procedure; (4) to examine safeguard measures taken
pursuant to Article XIX of GATT 1947 as well as emergency actions taken under GATT 1994,
monitor their phase-out, and make a report when appropriate to the Council for Trade in Goods;
(5) to review, at the request of a member taking a safeguard measure, whether proposals to
suspend concessions or other obligations are "substantially equivalent, and report the same to
the Council for Trade in Goods;" (6) to receive and review all notifications required by the
Agreement and report this to the Council for Trade in Goods; (7) to perform any other function
in connection with the Agreement the Council for Trade in Goods may determine. See Safe-
guards, supra note 101, art. 13.
105 See Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 11(2).
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An exception to this proscription may be granted, however, upon
mutual consent between the members concerned. The exception
would allow an importing member to one specific measure, the dura-
tion of which may extend up to December 31, 1999.106 The Annex to
the Agreement on Safeguards explicitly provides for the aforemen-
tioned exception to the VER rule. The European Community was
granted an exception to the VER prohibition with respect to its trade
with Japan of certain passenger cars and light commercial vehi-
cles107 -a VER which shall remain in effect until December 31, 1999.
In theory at least, the improvements to Article XIX will bring a great
degree of "predictablity" to the international trading system, including
the relationship of the developed members with the developing
countries. 0 8
But the escape clause's raison d'etre-to reduce the inflow of
highly competitive imported products into the local market-contin-
ues to maintain a collision course with the general orientation of the
liberal trading system of the GAIT 1994, enhancements notwithstand-
ing. Although the new rules seek to confine the scope of the escape
clause to the extent necessary only to prevent serious injury and to
facilitate adjustment, a critical "escape" from this redefined "escape
clause," is enshrined in the Agreement-surreptitiously planting a de-
vice for selectivity. Despite the more open quota allocation system
insisted by the rules, 09 an exception may be made by the importing
country (through "quota modulation") when it can clearly demon-
strate that imports from certain suppliers have increased in "dispro-
portionate percentage" during the representative period in
question. 110 In addition, it should also be shown that the departure
106 See Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 11(2).
107 Included in the VER with Japan are passenger cars, off road vehicles, light commercial
vehicles, light trucks (up to five tons), and the same vehicles in wholly knocked-down form
(CKD) sets. Safeguards, supra note 101, Annex to the Agreement on Safeguards.
108 UNCTAD SECRETARIAT, A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND AND THEIR EFFEcTs ON THE TRADING PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 42
(1994).
109 The key word here is "open": the new system is definitely more transparent than its pre-
cursor because the member applying the restrictions "may seek agreement" regarding the alloca-
tion of shares of the quota with all the suppliers concerned. But this consultation clause is
diluted by the concession that when it is not "reasonably practicable," the allocation of product
shares can be based on proportional percentages established during a representative period.
This exception guarantees built-in advantages for the stronger, or already established suppliers.
It would also be difficult to prevent collusion between the importing member and "favorite"
suppliers.
110 Safeguards, supra note 101, arts. 5(2)(a), 5(2)(b).
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from the regular quota allocation process"' is justified, and that the
conditions thereof are equitable to all suppliers of the product
concerned. Some misgivings can be raised with respect to the third
requirement, that "the conditions of such departure are equitable to
all suppliers of the product concerned," for it is precisely the depar-
ture from the normal procedure that would render the quota alloca-
tion inequitable to some of the suppliers.
There is no dispute that the increased transparency and predict-
ability of allocating the quotas streamlines the application of emer-
gency actions. But abuse of the open-ended exception could lead to
selective or discriminatory measures against the weaker suppliers
who, more often than not, originate from the economically weaker
member states, or more specifically, from the relatively weaker devel-
oping countries. Cognizant of the latter's plight, the Agreement sets
aside special rules reserved for developing countries. The value of
these provisions for the developing world should be judged, however,
in the context of their practical consequences vis-a-vis the suppliers
who occupy the more advantageous market position in the restricted
market. Will the preferential treatment granted to developing coun-
tries be sufficient to counterbalance the institutionally entrenched
position of the favored exporters? According to Article 9 of the
Agreement, as long as the developing country's share of the affected
imports does not exceed three percent, safeguard measures cannot be
applied. This exception is to be dispensed with when the developing
members who have less than a three percent share collectively ac-
count for more than nine percent of the total imports of the product
concerned.112 In contrast to the rules for other members, developing
states can extend their safeguard measures two years beyond the max-
imum eight year period." 3
This multi-layered Rubik's cube of stricter conditions and
prohibitions, coupled with contradictory concessions and com-
promises, perpetuates the tradition of balancing advantages and con-
111 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 5(2)(a). The Agreement provides: "In cases in which a
quota is allocated among supplying countries, the Member applying the restrictions may seek
agreement with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other Members having a
substantial interest in supplying the product concerned. In cases in which this method is not
reasonably practicable, the Member concerned shall allot to Members having a substantial inter-
est in supplying the product shares based upon the proportions, supplied by such Members dur-
ing a previous representative period of the total quantity or value of imports of the product, due
account being taken of any special factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade
in the product."
112 Safeguards, supra note 101, art 9(1).
113 Safeguards, supra note 101, arts 9(2) and 7(3).
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cessions in the old GATT. Such "balancing of advantages" in GATT
1994 may buttress the legal structure of the system, but may perpetu-
ate this old element of dysfunctionality found in the 1947 setup.
The term "balancing" of advantages or interests is actually a mis-
nomer because the scales have always been, and are still, tipped in
favor of the influential producer, the powerful importing nation, or
the established supplier. The conduct of this constellation of players
becomes increasingly difficult to predict, as the scope of operations of
many large firms are on a global scale and involve the overlapping of
many jurisdictions and interests. The more stringent conditions added
to the entire procedure, while laudable, may further persuade the ma-
jor players in the GATT system to resort to alternative measures, such
as the use of the antidumping weapon, as more flexible safeguard ac-
tions." 4 The new safeguard system cannot be improved without cor-
responding adjustments in the other relief measures in the trading
system.115 Pivotal is the provision in GATT 1994 that expressly de-
clares the "gray area" measure wholly unacceptable from the GATT
point of view.116 The issue that hangs in the balance is whether the
banning of these "distasteful" bilateral agreements-at least offi-
cially-can totally eliminate disguised unilateral actions and subtle
quid pro quo actions on the part of states who still consider the new
escape clause too tedious to be complied with faithfully. Will collud-
ing states be able to concoct a newfangled VER mutant to circumvent
the tighter hold of the new Safeguards Agreement? The new disci-
pline, to be of any practical utility, should "explicitly constrain the
temptation to use export-restraint arrangements" in any form as in-
struments of trade policy." 7
114 For an example of a discussion on this theme under the old rules which will still hold true
until the respective national legislatures or, in this case, the European Union, modify their na-
tional legislation to faithfully abide to the antidumping rules in the new Agreement, see Christo-
pher Norall, New Trends in Anti-dumping Practice in Brussels, 9 WORLD ECON. 1 (1986); The
New Amendments to the EC's Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation, COMMON MKT. L. REv. (1989);
Bernard M. Hoekman & Michael P. Leidy, Dumping, Antidumping and Emergency Protection,
23 J. OF WORLD TRADE 5, 27-44 (1989). A more recent contribution on the possible effects of
the new antidumping regulations to European antidumping policy is Paul Waer & Edwin
Vermulst, EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after the Uruguay Round, 28 J. OF WORLD
TRADE 2, 5-21 (1994). See also Senti's brief summary of the new antidumping section in the
Final Act in Richard Senti, GATT-WTO: Die neue Welthandelsordnung nach der Uruguay-
Runde, INSTrrrur FOR WIRTSCHAFT'FORSCHUNG DER ETH ZORIcH, 86-91 (1994).
115 See Hamilton & Whalley, supra note 46, at 91.
116 See Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 11(1)(b).
117 John H. Jackson, Consistency of Export-Restraint Arrangements with the GATT, 11
WORLD ECON. 485, 497 (1988).
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It should be reiterated once again that neither GATT disobedi-
ence, nor GATT fatalism is advocated in this exposition. The effectiv-
ness of the GATT is dependent not only on the strength of an
integrated dispute settlement regulation which will make protectionist
biases more difficult to carry out, and on the new institutional struc-
ture of the World Trade Organization, 1 8 but also on the feasibility of
a fair and equitable implementation of the rules and the willingness of
the major players to adapt to the new game. In the final analysis, it
can only be the concerted effort on the part of the economically pow-
erful members of the GATT to voluntarily restrain themselves from
undermining the fortified ramparts of the reinforced safeguard sys-
tem. It is still an open question whether the United States, for in-
stance, would be willing to give up its occasional resort to "aggressive
unilateralism," 119 or the European Community its highly discretionary
antidumping policies.
Even as the Uruguay Round negotiations proceeded, authorities
in both the European Community and the United States persisted in
introducing rules and procedures aimed at competition, be it fair or
unfair. Robertson, who has closely followed the development of safe-
guard actions and VERs for some time, concludes that in developed
countries (and especially in technologically-sophisticated industries),
"trade remedy actions are now treated as a right," and there is no
indication that they will be relinquished. l 0 The United States' declin-
ing dominance in the world economy, the European Community's sin-
gle market program associated with reciprocity in trade, and Japan's
persistence in penetrating work markets in manufacturing increase the
risks of protectionism in the post-Uruguay Round world.'21
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development en-
gages us with a caveat in its recent preliminary report on the effects of
the Uruguay Round on developing countries:
In this context, a determining factor would be the extent to which the
major trading entities actually respect their obligations in the sense of not
abusing the flexibility built into various agreements, and in renouncing
action seeking to obtain concessions through bilateral pressures entailing
the threat of punitive action rather than through the offering of reciprocal
118 See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Why do Governments Need the Uruguay Round Agreements,
NAFTA and the EEA?, 49 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFr 1, 31-55 (1994).
119 See AGGRESSIVE UNILATERAUSM (Jagdish N. Bhagwati ed., 1990).
120 See David Robertson, GATT Rules for Emergency Protection, TRADE POLICY RESEARCH
CENTRE, HARVESTER WrHEATSHEAF 95 (1992).
121 Juergen Wiemann, The Implications of the Uruguay Round and the Single Market for the
European Community's Trade Policy towards Developing Countries, Berlin: Occasional Papers
of the German Development Institute (GDI), No. 99, at 21-24 (1990).
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benefits (emphasis added). The respective changes sought in domestic
trade laws to accomodate the provisions of the Uruguay Round agree-
ments would serve as an important indication of their eventual impact
on world trade.12
True, the dispute settlement proceeding has been elevated to a
procedure almost resembling judicial enforcement.12 But since there
is an interplay between the legal and political-economic factors, the
new GATT rules should be useful and workable, or at the barest mini-
mum, perceived to be such by the contracting parties-from the view-
points of both advantaged and disadvantaged member states. The
litany of woes expounded by numerous scholars relating how the safe-
guard measure was abandoned in favor of the VER and its ilk simply
demonstrate that Article XIX in its original form was, or was per-
ceived to be, ineffective or too expensive. As the VER became more
the rule than the exception, it became increasingly apparent that the
VER had become the most "expedient" solution to the decline of
competitiveness. Thus, while GAT 1994 arguably improves the for-
mal parameters of the emergency action, the inconsistency of the orig-
inal concept with the GAT system, though reduced, has been carried
over and may continue to hamper its serviceability. As a consequence,
parties may weave in and out of the GAT framework pursuant to
their respective strategic considerations-as they have in the past.
122 UNCTAD SECa'TARLA4T, supra note 108, at 44.
123 See Safeguards, supra note 101, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes, arts. 2(1), 3, 3(4), 17(1), 17(6), 17(13), 17(14). The dispute
settlement of the new World Trade Organization is the central element in providing the security
and predictability to the international trading system (Article 3). A Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) is to be created under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, to administer the
rules of the consultation and dispute settlement procedures of the agreements covered by the
Final Act. The DSB shall have the authority to establish panels, adopt panel and Appellate
Body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation of rulings and recommendations, and
authorize suspension of concessions and other obligations under the covered agreements (Arti-
cle 2(1)). The DSB shall issue recommendations and rulings aimed at achieving a satisfactory
settlement of disputes in accordance with the rights and obligations covered by the agreements.
(Article 3(4)). The new rules provide an appellate procedure that gives a party to a dispute a
right to appeal a panel report on issues of law to a standing Appellate Body within sixty days
after the circulation thereof (Article 16(4) and Article 17(1) & (6)). The Appellate Body is
empowered to uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel report
(Article 17(13)). Most important, the Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to
adopt the Appellate Body report within thirty days following its circulation to the Members. (Arti-
cle 17(14)). In other words, the decision to adopt the panel report and the decision of the Ap-
pellate Body reviewing the panel report on legal grounds resides ultimately in the DSB and not
on the unanimous consent of the contracting parties, as in GATT 1947. The DSB is undoubtedly
clothed with a unique form of judicial power with extraterritorial reach to adjudicate trade dis-
putes covered by the agreements with finality, removing the ultimate discretion to adopt panel
reports from the member states.
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B. Specific Provisions
The Agreement on Safeguards in the GATT 1994 in its Preamble
mentions the need to clarify and reinforce the safeguard mechanism in
the GATT framework, to reestablish multilateral control over safe-
guards, and to eliminate measures that escape such control. 24 In a
nutshell, the Agreement hopes to bring all emergency actions and
their nuances under the GATT umbrella. The Preamble summarizes
what the expanded provisions of the new Article XIX set out to do: It
boasts of sections that finally define some of the open-ended catego-
ries mentioned in the old Article XIX, such as "serious injury,"
"threat of serious injury," and "domestic injury;"'" circumscribes the
application of safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to pre-
vent serious injury; 126 strengthens the multilateral aspect of the clause
by laying down more specific rules for the consultation process;12 7and
most significantly, prohibits any form of VERs, OMAs or similar
agreements, 128 while phasing out those in existence at the time of the
Agreement. 29 Furthermore, by reiterating the importance of struc-
tural adjustment and competition in the Preamble, the Agreement im-
plies that emergency actions should not lose sight of the real solution
to the problem; safeguard measures are merely the means to the end.
In another context, such a reminder implicitly acknowledges the clash
between the short-term and long-term objectives of the safeguard
clause.
Articles 2, 4 and 5 in the Agreement on Safeguards puts in black
and white what has more or less been confirmed by GATT practice
and custom. The condition for the application of safeguards is practi-
cally identical to the GATT 1947 provision, except for the clarification
that the increased quantities imported may be "absolute or relative to
domestic production.' 130 The controversy over the nondiscriminatory
application of the Article is put to rest when the Agreement categori-
cally states that the measure be applied to a product "irrespective of
its source.''
The "serious injury" definitions in Articles 2 and 4 are not cured
of the causal link between injury with "increased quantities" of the
124 Safeguards, supra note 101, Preamble, 2nd paragraph.
125 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 4.
126 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 5.
127 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 12.
128 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 11(1)(b).
129 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 11(2).
130 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 2(1).
131 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 2(2).
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product. 132 From an economic point of view, the increase in the quan-
tity of imports does not "cause" conditions in the local industry; it is
merely an "effect" precipitated by the "interplay of supply and de-
mand forces at home and abroad." But the factors that constitute this
supply and demand paradigm-income, consumer tastes, technology,
input prices-are the real causal variables. 33 Although the juxtaposi-
tion in time of increased imports and the "significant overall impair-
ment in the position of a domestic industry" need not establish a
causal relation, GAIT practice and custom concedes such a determi-
nation.13 The new rules, therefore, still maintain this "low threshold"
for determining a connection between increased quantities of imports
and injury. Member states can still invoke the escape clause when
deteriorating domestic demand echoes an increase in the market share
of competing foreign suppliers. An actual decline in competitive ad-
vantage is not registered as a factor in the enumeration in Article
4(2)(a). 35 The fundamental issue of the relative competitiveness of
the foreign competitor and the domestic producer has not yet been
solved. Article 4(2)(b) of the Agreement, however, attempts to re-
duce the repercussions of this intentioned oversight by providing that
the investigation to determine whether the increased imports have
132 Safeguards, supra note 101, arts. 2 and 4. Article 2 provides: "A Member may apply a
safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has determined, pursuant to the provisions
set out below, that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities,
absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or threaten to
cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or directly competitive
products."
Article 4(l)(a) provides: "'serious injury' shall be understood to mean a significant overall
impairment in the position of a domestic industry."
133 Alan 0. Sykes, GATT Safeguards Reform: The Injury Test, in FAiR EXCHANGE: RE-
FORMING TRADE REMEDY LAWS 203, 205-06 (Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert C. York, eds.,
C.D. Howe Institute, Policy Study No. 11, 1990).
134 Kenneth Dam wrote that "It is more doubtful that the requirements of Article XIX are
met by an absolute increase in quantities which, because of an even greater increase in consump-
tion, represents a decrease relative to production. Even if the 'increased quantities' causal stan-
dard can be said to be met, the relative increase in domestic production may negate the idea of
'serious injury.' (next paragraph) In spite of their rigorous and complicated nature, these sub-
stantive requirements tend to be relatively innocuous in practice as a consequence of the operation
of a procedural rule." (Emphasis added). DAM, supra note 10, at 102.
135 Article 4(2)(a) reads: In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have
caused or are threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the terms of this
Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and
quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and
amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative terms, the
share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in the level of sales, produc-
tion, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and employment. Safeguards, supra
note 101, at art. 4(2)(a).
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caused or threaten serious injury should demonstrate, on the basis of
objective evidence, the existence of the causal link. Moreover, when
there are other factors other than increased imports that cause injury
to the domestic country, the causal connection shall not be
confirmed. 136
Alas, in practical terms, the more precise definitions relating to
the concept of "serious injury," do not pose a heavy burden on the
affected producer to prove "serious injury." While "serious injury,"
now requires a "significant overall impairment in the position of a do-
mestic industry,"'13 7 the more defined investigatory process to deter-
mine the latter still rests in the hands of the "competent authorities"
of that member. 38 These same administrative authorities shall evalu-
ate all the relevant factors contributing to the status of the affected
industry,'39 and shall establish the "causal link" to the serious injury
on the basis of objective evidence.14 0
If what commentators say about the powerful political influence
of producers over politicians is valid,141 pressure from producers
could, as in the past, be brought to bear on the "competent authori-
ties" to confirm "serious injury," despite the inclusion of all other "in-
terested parties" (notably the consumer groups) to submit their
evidence.' 42 It must be noted, however, that under the accord, only
member states can apply for safeguard measures; private parties are
not given the right of action to bring complaints against their own
governments. Publication requirements to ensure transparency, which
shall include the findings and reasoned conclusions of such investiga-
tion by the competent authorities, 43 may inauspiciously dampen the
enthusiasm of overzealous national authorities who may be too willing
to surrender to the influence of producer groups.
Like the antidumping proceeding in Article VI and its counter-
parts in American'" and European 145 law, a wide latitude of discre-
136 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 4(2)(b).
137 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 4(1)(a).
138 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 3(1).
139 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 4(2)(a).
140 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 4(2)(b).
141 See Petersmann, supra notes 6, 44, 55-57, 85 and 118.
142 See Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 3(2).
143 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 3(1).
144 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Antidumping and Countervailing Duties and the GATT An Eval-
uation and a Proposal for a Unified Remedy for Unfair International Trade," 30 GERMAN Y.B.
INT'L LAW 177 (1987).
145 The standard work in this field is Ivo vAN BAEL & JEAN-FRANCOIS BELLIS, ANTI-DUMP-
ING AND OTHER TRADE PROTEC'ION LAWS LN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1990).
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tion given to the administrators of the trade policy instrument,
coupled with hidden agendas in trade policies, may be strong enough
a temptation to favor a finding of injury.'46 "Public interest" is men-
tioned as a factor in the application of safeguard measures. This qual-
ification hardly discards the built-in advantage of producers' interests
in the debate because their rallying cries-"unemployment," "loss of
jobs," "cheap imports"-are always successful in winning policymak-
ers over to their side.
In the Agreement, there is a praiseworthy attempt to check the
abuse of the safeguard measure by setting time limits and procedural
safety nets. It shall apply "only to the extent necessary to prevent or
remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment,"' 47 and shall not
last longer than four years"'4-unless the competent authorities deter-
mine, pursuant to certain checks-and-balances, that the safeguard
measure continues to be needed to prevent serious injury, with the
condition that there is evidence that the industry is adjusting. 4 9 A
safeguard measure, including the period of initial and/or provisional
application, can run for four years with an extension to eight years,
but shall not exceed eight years in the case of developed countries5
At the very least, the above limitations furnish an assurance that the
emergency actions taken would be temporary. In view of the more
delicate situation of developing countries, the latter's measures may
last up to ten years.' 5 '
Seeking to phase out still existing applications of Article XIX,
safeguard measures which were applied pursuant to GAIT 1947 and
in existence at the time the WTO agreement came into effect shall be
terminated "not later than eight years after the date on which they
were first applied or five years after the date of entry into force of the
WTO agreement," whichever comes later.152 These limits, however,
are not of earth-shaking importance to the international trading re-
gime because of the paltry number of safeguard measures still in exist-
ence. An additional restriction in the Agreement covers the use of
quantitative restrictions. As a general rule, such measures shall not be
146 See the particular application of European antidumping laws on the East Asian NICs in
Ernesto M. Hizon, Antidumping and the European Policy vis-a-vis the East Asian NICs, 18
WORLD COMPETTON 1 (1994).
147 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 5(1).
148 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 7(1).
149 See Safeguards, supra note 101, arts 2, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 12.
150 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 7(3).
151 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 9(2).
152 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 10.
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below the level of imports of a recent period, i.e., the average of im-
ports in the last three representative years, unless clear justification is
given to warrant a different level of imports to prevent serious in-
jury. 5 3 Unlike the old rule, provisional safeguard measures in case of
critical circumstances where delay may cause damage "difficult to re-
pair" require a preliminary determination of injury based on clear evi-
dence. The provisional measure can only last for a maximum of two
hundred days, during which the procedural requirements of the es-
cape clause should be met. 54
A novel feature that aims to encourage structural adjustment to
the imports is the provision for progressive liberalization at regular
intervals during the period of the measure's application, if the ex-
pected operation of the measure exceeds one year. If the measure
exceeds three years, the member applying it is obliged to make a mid-
term review and adjust the pace of liberalization accordingly. 155
Retaliation is still an option available to the affecting exporting
member, in spite of the fact that governments have been less disposed
to invoke the escape clause because it involves negotiating compensa-
tion. Members are enjoined to reach a consensus on an "adequate
means of trade compensation" for the effects of the safeguard mea-
sure on their trade,'156 but if no agreement is reached within thirty
days under the consultation procedure provided, the affected member
may retaliate by suspending "substantially equivalent" concessions or
obligations,'157 provided the Council for Trade in Goods does not dis-
approve the form of retaliation. 58
In stark comparison to the immediate right of retaliation allowed
in the GATT 1947 rules, the parties in GATr 1994 are given some
kind of a "cooling-off period" before they are entitled to retaliation.
The Agreement thus permits a waiver of compensation requirements.
The relaxation of the rule approving immediate retaliation can admit-
tedly reduce the tendency towards selectivity. The mandatory three
year delay gives the parties involved the opportunity to resolve their
conflicts through other means available in GATT 1994, such as the
improved dispute settlement proceeding or arbitration. 59 The right
153 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 5(1).
154 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 6.
155 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 7(4).
156 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 8(1).
157 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 8(2).
158 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 8(2).
159 See Safeguards, Annex 2 to the Final Act, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes 404.
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of suspension of obligations under the revised regulation cannot be
exercised for the initial three years the safeguard measure is in opera-
tion, "provided that the safeguard measure has been taken as a result
of an absolute increase in imports and that such a measure conforms
to the provision of this Agreement.' 160
A Committee on Safeguards, created under the Agreement, acts
as a kind of administrative body, answerable to a Council for Trade in
Goods, for the general implementation of the provisions in the Agree-
ment on Emergency Actions on Imports. A member state notifies the
Committee on Safeguards upon initiating an investigatory process re-
lating to emergency action under the Agreement. Moreover, the
member state informs the Committee of its findings of serious injury
and its decisions to apply safeguard measures. 161 Members are also
required to notify the same Committee of their laws, regulations and
administrative procedures relating to safeguard measures;162 the main-
tenance of existing measures;163 and non-governmental measures164
Mandated notifications in the investigatory process; 165 in the submis-
sion of evidence; in the proposed timetables for application of the
safeguard measures;166 in the relevant laws and administrative regula-
tions;167 in the requirements in the application of provisional safe-
guards16 or existing safeguard measures; 69 and in the reports of
discussions and mid-term reviews17 0-all of which form the bedrock
of the enhanced consultation process-are also forwarded to this
Committee.
VI. A PROGNOSIS: BACK TO TBE FUTURE
The strategic interaction between the safeguard clause and the
mighty VER will not cease with the new Agreement on Safeguards.
GATT 1994 perpetuates the Janus-faced dilemma of the safeguard
measure and the VER. Indeed, the escape clause's boundaries have
been defined and the VERs outlawed, yet the effectiveness of the new
rules of the game will largely depend on the willingness of the major
160 Safeguards, supra note 101, art 8(3).
161 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 12(1).
162 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 12(6).
163 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 12(7).
164 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 12(9).
165 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 12(1).
166 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 12(2).
167 Safeguards, supra note 101, arts. 12(6) & 12(8).
168 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 12(4).
169 Safeguards, supra note 101, art. 12(7).
170 Safeguards, supra note 101, arts. 12(3) & 12(5).
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players in the trading system to conform to them. As it would be
more difficult to comply with the more stringent requirements for the
application of the safeguard clause, it remains doubtful if more mem-
ber states would opt for the measure. It is more plausible to assume
that the antidumping and countervailing duty, and the possible "price
undertaking" compromise under such a regime, would presumably be
the trade policy instrument of choice of many developed countries,
1994 modifications notwithstanding. The fact that antidumping is in-
creasingly resorted to by developing nations is further proof of its
growing viability.
Unilateral actions, such as the Section 301 and Super 301 provi-
sions available to the United States, hang like a Damocles sword over
the heads of Japan, the East Asian NICs and, in some instances, the
European Community, when certain American economic interests are
involved. Even if the Final Act resulting from the Uruguay Round
negotiations is eventually ratified by all contracting parties, aggressive
unilateralism from any party shall negate any advances made by the
GATT towards broader multilateralism.
VERs by their very nature are chameleon-like, adjusting and mu-
tating according to the needs of the parties involved. They are also
the least transparent and difficult to verify. The new Agreement on
Safeguards pointedly prohibits all types of VERs and brings all ex-
isting VERs within the ambit of the GATT. Surely, this will be one of
the most critical provisions in the entire GATT 1994 text; its effective
implementation is crucial to the success of the future world trade or-
der. But if history is any guide, it is highly likely that member states,
whether large or small, would nonetheless try to manage an amount of
flexibility vis-a-vis the VER issue. The new Uruguay Round Agree-
ment does not diminish by an iota the inherent attractiveness of the
VER insolving trade conflicts and easing political pressures at home
with a minimum of fuss. The essence of the VER dissuades those en-
tangled in its web to expose it to the uncertainty of multilateral con-
sensus. It will take a sea-change in the mindset of the GATT member
states to guarantee that the VER problem will finally be resolved
under the new 1994 regime.
